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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 11-1048 
______________ 
 
BRUCE SCOTT, 
 
         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ALLIED WASTE SERVICES OF BUCKS-MONT 
 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-10-cv-00105) 
Honorable Berle M. Schiller, District Judge 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 6, 2011 
 
BEFORE:  McKEE, Chief Judge, and FUENTES and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: October 19, 2011) 
______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
This matter comes on before this Court on appeal from a final order entered  in 
favor of Allied Services of Bucks-Mont on December 23, 2010, in this multi-claim 
employment discrimination action that plaintiff-appellant Bruce Scott brought against 
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Allied Services following its termination of Scott’s employment.  Scott brought this 
action invoking both federal and Pennsylvania state law, the federal claims seeking relief 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Family and Medical Leave Act and the 
state claims seeking relief under the parallel provisions of the Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Act.  Allied Services employed Scott prior to his termination as a helper in 
picking up trash from residential customers and in cleaning Allied Services’ yard. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), 28 U.S.C. § 
1331, and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  On this 
appeal we exercise de novo review of the District Court’s judgment and opinion.  See 
Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 2004).  Consequently, we can affirm the 
summary judgment only if there is no dispute as to any material fact and Allied Services 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
 The District Court set forth the background of this matter in its comprehensive 
opinion and therefore we have no need to repeat what it said.  Scott attributes the adverse 
employment actions of which he complains to discrimination against him attributable to 
Allied Services’ and its employees’ view of him on account of his mental state and his 
need to care for his son who suffered from hemophilia.   
 In reviewing Scott’s federal claims we employ the burden shifting framework that 
the Supreme Court adopted in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 
S.Ct. 1817 (1973), for employment discrimination cases and that the courts later have 
followed in other contexts.  Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff initially must establish 
3 
 
that he can demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination.  If the plaintiff cannot make 
that showing he loses his case.  If he can make that showing the defendant has the burden 
to produce evidence that it engaged in the adverse employment action of which the 
plaintiff complains for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.  If the defendant satisfies 
the burden of producing that evidence but the jury nevertheless finds that the defendant 
discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of an unlawful ground under a 
discrimination law, it can return a verdict for the plaintiff.  See St. Mary’s Honor Center, 
509 U.S. 502, 510-11, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2749-50 (1993).  In applying the Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Act we use the same burden-shifting process.  See Rinehimer v. 
Cemcolift Inc., 292 F.3d 375, 382 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 Though not definitively so holding, the District Court decided the case on the 
assumption that Scott satisfied his initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of 
discrimination.  The Court, however, found that considering the undisputed material facts 
Scott did not demonstrate that Allied Services’ facially legitimate explanations for its 
adverse employment actions were pretextual.  After our review of this matter we agree 
with the Court but add two things.  First, Allied Services, which we note had employed 
Scott for five years, took considerable steps during his employment to accommodate 
Scott’s problems.  Second, though Scott complains of what he regards was Allied 
Services’ requirement that he submit to an unjustified “illegal medical examination,” 
considering the information that had come to Allied Services’ attention prior to it 
requiring the examination it almost was compelled to take some steps to ensure Scott’s 
4 
 
and its other employees’ safety.  In fact, in our experience we sometimes see cases in 
which plaintiffs seek to impose liability on a defendant when in situations like that Allied 
Services confronted here they have not taken appropriate protective steps that may 
include requiring that medical examinations be made.  We recognize that Scott considers 
that it was wrongful for Allied Services to require that he submit to an examination based 
on the hearsay information that Allied Services had regarding him.  We, however, reject 
his argument for in conducting its affairs an employer need not follow the procedure used 
in court proceedings and thus it is free to act on the basis of what it regards as sufficient 
information even if it is hearsay.  We reiterate that on the basis of the information it had 
with respect to Scott’s mental state Allied Services would have been remiss if it had not 
required the medical examination. 
 The Order of December 23, 2010, will be affirmed. 
